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Over the last decade the psychological and neurobiological approach to aesthetics has collected
relevant data about the experience of art, aesthetic products, natural phenomena, and non-artistic
objects—even if these data are somewhat divergent depending on the many differences in the
stimuli, procedures, techniques, instructions, and tasks that are used (Chatterjee, 2011; Nadal
and Skov, 2013). Given the strong historical association of the concept of beauty with art and
aesthetics, the first applications of neuroimaging to visual aesthetic experience involved a privileged
position for perceptual beauty (Cela-Conde et al., 2004; Kawabata and Zeki, 2004; Vartanian and
Goel, 2004) but see also (Jacobsen, 2010; Ishizu and Zeki, 2013; Chatterjee, 2014). However, art
history clearly shows that more often than not great artworks, especially modern ones, inhibit
ordinary perceptual routines, violate predictions, involve disorder, disorganization, disharmony,
ambiguity, contradictions, indeterminacy, uncertainty, strangeness, and so on (Bullot and Reber,
2013). Moreover, since Duchamp’s use of everyday objects, the borders between art and non-art
have been somewhat blurred, so that modern art requires a larger need for interpretation than any
previous art (Leder, 2013). Finally, a given aesthetic object often serves a multiplicity of purposes
for different people with different skills, in different contexts, and at different times (Nadal and
Pearce, 2011).
In line with these features, the general focus of experimental studies has been rapidly and
deeply reoriented. In particular, the neuropsychological approach to aesthetics has quickly gone
beyond perceptual beauty and simple preference (Chatterjee and Vartanian, 2014). I propose that,
if we consider with attention the more recent general trends of studies, at present the cognitive
psychology and neuroscience of aesthetics are centered on aesthetic experience conceived as an
experience of knowledge. First and foremost, this means that differences in processing experience
influence aesthetic perception and evaluation—for instance, see the various studies concerning
the effect of fluency on aesthetic appreciation (Reber et al., 2004). From this point of view,
aesthetic experience is a function of previous knowledge and already acquired skills. However,
recent evidence also shows that aesthetic experience represents at the same time a means of
improving knowledge and enabling further skills acquisition. In this way, aesthetic experience is
also cause and source of knowledge and skills. According tomy point of view, this new perspective is
undoubtedly shown by current behavioral, neuropsychological, and brain imaging data concerning
three relevant and interconnected lines of inquiry: (a) gestalt formation and dis/fluent appreciation;
(b) fiction and high-quality art; (c) experts/non-experts processing differences.
(a) Recent experiments concerning the aesthetic appreciation empirically demonstrate the deep
relationship between perceptual insights and aesthetic pleasure. In the first study (Muth et al.,
2012), photographs of cubist artworks by Picasso, Braque, and Gris were shown to participants
without expertise in cubist art. The study was structured in two blocks, each showing the
stimuli in a randomized order. During the first block, subjects had to rate the pictures on liking.
During the second block, subjects rated how well they could detect objects within the artwork.
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All ratings were chosen from a 7-point-Likert-scale from 1
(“not at all”) to 7 (“very”). Data across participant revealed
a strong relationship between the detectability of objects
and liking, confirming that also in aesthetic perception form
recognition is closely related to appreciation. In the second
study (Muth and Carbon, 2013), two-tone images either
containing a hidden form (i.e., a face) or not were repeatedly
presented for half a second to participants. Stimuli were
shown in a randomized order block-wise 13 times. The tasks
alternated block-wise between choosing from a 7-point scale
from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very good”) how much one liked
the picture and a detecting block. The latter comprised two
ratings on a 1 plus 7-point scale (0: “no face recognized”;
7: “very clear”). Insight was defined by the highest gain in
clearness between two subsequent blocks per participant
and stimulus. All liking ratings per participant and block
were then shifted in regard to their temporal occurrence
relative to the insight block. Data clearly demonstrated that
liking only significantly increased after having an insight; the
intensity of insight, defined as degrees of clearness ratings,
showed direct influences on the degrees of liking.
This evidence supports the dis/fluent and dynamic
conception of aesthetic appreciation. It is undoubtedly true
that in general variables able to influence processing
fluency (such as perceptual and semantic priming,
stimulus repetition, and prototypicality) increase aesthetic
appreciation (Forster et al., 2013). However, aesthetic
appreciation often involves the success in establishing a new
predictable pattern on a different level and so the transition
from an initial state of uncertainty, associated with an
unpleasant and negative affect, to a subsequent state of
increased predictability, associated with an affective reward
(Van de Cruys and Wagerman, 2011).
(b) Recent experimental results concerning fictional narratives
indicates that the distinction between high-quality art
and low-quality art can be empirically supported. Five
experiments (with non-experts) show that reading literary
fiction (such as De Lillo) temporarily enhances theory of
mind, leading to a better performance in several well-
established tests compared with reading popular fiction
(such as the best-sellers of Gillian Flynn)—an activity that
gives similar results to reading non-fiction and reading
nothing (Kidd and Castano, 2013). For the first time
scientific evidence suggests that (I) reading fiction really does
have cognitive benefits, improving our social abilities; (II)
aesthetic quality is determined by the different ways in which
art involves readers, by guiding and prescribing different
processing dynamics. Low-quality fiction typically tends
to adopt ordinary templates, characterized by stereotypical
and easily predictable patterns, with the goal of triggering
intense emotions. The relevant information is familiar,
it comes quickly and accurately to mind, it allows a
fast recognition. Aesthetic appreciation is static: liking is
a function of the fluency and ease of the interpreters’
processing dynamics. In contrast, high-quality fiction
typically tends to change conventional schemata, frustrating
interpreters’ expectations, with the goal of stimulating
creative thought and disrupting stereotypes, biases, and
prejudices. The relevant information is open to more
than one interpretation, it enables a network of new and
surprising associations and meanings, and it recursively
promptsmultiple cycles of perception and conceptualization.
Aesthetic appreciation is dynamic: it is determined by
an optimal amount of (un)predictability, which allows
resolution to a recognized configuration (Van de Cruys and
Wagerman, 2011; Bullot and Reber, 2013).
(c) Even when experts and non-experts appreciate the same
artworks and share the same canon (Locher, 2011; Meskin
et al., 2013), nonetheless their processing dynamics remain
very different. Non-experts base their understanding on
what is depicted (the content and their emotional reactions
to it), whilst experts use art-specific classifications, related
to prototypes of single artists or art schools (Augustin and
Leder, 2006). Expertise increases liking and comprehension:
compared to non-experts, experts like classical, abstract,
and modern artworks more and find artworks more
understandable (Leder et al., 2012). Finally, compared to
non-experts, experts show attenuated emotional responses
and like artworks more even when they perceive and judge
negative and disturbing images: their emotional reaction is
attenuated by attention to style and artistic execution (Leder
et al., 2014). These findings show that the neural processes
involved in aesthetic experience reflect interpreters’
developmental and educational histories (Vartanian and
Kaufman, 2013). In addition, they indicate that expertise
represents the key component to understanding and
appreciating dis/fluency.
In my reading, even if these lines of inquiry lack an
overall integration, taken together they clearly suggest that the
neuropsychological approach is increasingly framing aesthetic
experience as a complex and multifaceted experience of
knowledge—more precisely, as a specific implementation of the
epistemic goal of knowing that becomes active when people
experience objects (and not only artworks) adopting an aesthetic
viewing orientation (Cupchik et al., 2009). This progressive
shifting from the initial and privileged focus on perceptual beauty
to the current relevance of concepts such as insight, gestalt
formation, increased performance, meaning, understanding, and
interpretation makes very difficult to reduce the scope of the
neuropsychological approach to the restrictive study of the neural
bases of beauty perception in art (Di Dio and Gallese, 2009).
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